29 March 2010

Memory, anger, forgiveness

The other day, on the homeward leg of our regular exercise, our dog dashed off after, presumably, a rabbit or a squirrel. It does remind me of 'Up' where the dogs seem to be only too easily distracted by just the possibility of a squirrel. Anyway, I found myself waiting for Alfi to come back, calling him every so often. Time drags when you're waiting in those circumstances: I couldn't see where he'd got to, couldn't hear any clues. It was probably only two or three minutes but it did drag. Then, Alfi shows himself, loping up the hill towards me looking as happy as a dog ever does.

Meanwhile, I'm feeling annoyed. He's kept me waiting, he's ignored or been slow to heed my calls. If he'd been human I might even have regarded him as being rude or inconsiderate. So I'm cross.

If he were human.

There's the rub. Of course. He isn't. And my feelings are just not really appropriate. More than that, if I act on those feelings, my dog will likely completely misunderstand and I will end up 'saying' to him things which will likely increase his likelihood of staying away.

Firstly, my feelings are not appropriate. At least to some degree. This is because they are based on reactions to models in my head based on human social interactions and their interpretation. Alfi isn't being disobedient, or rude. He's following a strong instinct and we haven't yet found a way to get his attention to stop him doing so when we need him not to do so. He's not making a choice in the way a human would. He's not disrespecting me. My reacting as if he is disrespecting me is simply a misrepresentation on my part. 'Misrepresentation' in terms of my representing the matter to myself; my understanding of it.

And then my dog would not understand this. He's a dog. I'm told that he has a short-term memory of around 7 seconds, meaning that if something happened longer-ago than those 7 seconds, he won't have a chance of associating it with whatever I might do in the present -whether it be to praise or to punish. As he comes back, the main thing in his mind is likely to be that he's coming back to me, not that he ran off and perhaps I called after him (whatever that might 'mean' to him). So if I chide him, all I'll probably succeed in doing is to apparently express my displeasure that he's coming back! He's no means to associate my displeasure with his running off; that's out of the frame of his memory and attention. So my only option at this point is to reinforce that it is good that he's coming back by making something of a fuss of him. I need to do this because, whatever else, it's important that he knows that it is good (for me and so for him) for him to come back. I want him to come back. It's just that I'd like him to be more prompt about it in certain circumstances.

So I'm left reflecting on myself, as so often when considering interacting with our dog. I'm not alone: Raising Hero: "Dogs are here in our lives for one reason; to help us become more conscious". I resonate with that.
I reflect that my own anger/displeasure is borne of my perception of the intentions of the other as well as of being thwarted in my plans or desires.
I reflect that, therefore, suffering a hurt or detriment is one thing; experiencing it (through our interpretation) as a personal hurt is another thing.

I may become agitated because my desire to do something (eg get home at the end of a walk) is frustrated. That may pass once either something else replaces my concern or when the activity can be resumed. That is if it is simply circumstances that have interrupted my ability to fulfil my desire at that point. If, on the other hand, there is personal agency involved in frustrating my aim, the frustration remains even after the passing of the blockage to my goal. It remains because the frustration now associates with the personal 'detriment'. That is, if someone does something to frustrate my goal, and I perceive the frustration to be a result of their personal volition, then the displeasure I feel is associated with that person and in particular their attitude or design; their ill-will. It is now personal, not impersonal.

In such a circumstance, then the mere removal of the blockage to my goal in physical terms (let us suppose) is not sufficient to begin to assuage my displeasure or anger. I need to deal also with the personal relationship dimension: the perceived or presumed ill-will. If that is still there, or thought to be there, then I can't move on. If I discover that there was no ill-will, just a mistake or even 'not unreasonable thoughtlessness'. Then, on the whole, my displeasure disperses, as if the matter were impersonal.

If I discover that the matter did involve some kind of ill-will, or that it has now acquired an overlay of ill-will (because the other party becomes pleased, for some reason, that some misfortune has visited me); that's a different matter. I head towards 'fight', 'flight' or 'reconciliation'. If 'fight', then I seek to impose on the other some punishment or revenge. If the reconciliation then I 'absorb' the distress myself rather than 'export' it by imposing it on the other person. If I choose 'flight' then I absorb it but without reconciliation and it becomes stressful and is likely to erupt in future relating with the person concerned; it is, so to say, a latent 'fight'.

This is why memory is so important to this whole issue. Without memory of the detriment, there is nothing to forgive. Without memory of it, relating is not hampered by recollection or reactivation of past wrong.

And of course, if it is no longer interpreted as 'wrong' (as for example when it is recognised to be accidental) it also is not a barrier to relating. Hence, on both counts, forgiveness is not something my dog can give or receive. To forgive and be forgiven we have to both be able to recall a wrong and to associate it with current conditions and/or relationships. We also have to have a concept of 'wrong' to hang it on. Without a sense of ill-will we can't conceive of 'wrong' in anyway except something that happens not to have suited us at the time. Ill-will gives a detriment the status of a wrong and turns a wound into an injury (in-jur-y).

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