Monogamy evolution -providential ethics

Around a quarter of primate species practice monogamy, suggesting that there is a biological background to it. Now, of course, if it was totally driven by instinct it wouldn't be a moral question. So, I'm suggesting, the combination of biological drivers and some moral reasoning based on big ethical themes gives quite a strong case for preferring it. Here's the report in NS:

Suckling infants are most likely to be killed by unrelated males, in order to bring the mother back into ovulation. With pair-bonding in place, not only would a mother have a male to help protect the infant from marauding males, but there would then be the opportunity for the male to help care for it by providing extra resources. This means the infant can be weaned earlier, again reducing the chance of it being killed.  Monogamy evolved to keep baby-killers away - life - 30 July 2013 - New Scientist

As I read that I was put in mind of one of the insights that shows up in the debate on marriage and divorce: the position of women in pre-modern society was (and often still is, actually) somewhat precarious economically without adult men in the household and a recently unmarried woman's difficulties were multiplied. Thus it can be argued that a strong reason for not making divorce easy is to protect women and to discourage a disposible attitude towards them.

It seems to me that the 'protecting baby' matter bringing about monogamy (though mechanisms are hazy but presumably relating to infant survival rates for faithful fathers) has a similar sort of feel to it. There are sensible reasons why, in general terms, it's a good idea. We should note, too, that the evolutionary basis to this would suggest that there is a certain 'built-in-ness' about this (which may apply to the drive towards faithfulness too). However, as creatures able to reflect and create meanings and act differently as a result, quasi-instinctual drives can be overruled. And so that leaves open at that point the question about the ethical meaning of such a discovery/hypothesis.

I think that this is where we need care, of course. The long-established principle of moral reasoning is that you can't derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. In other words just because things are a particular way doesn't make it right. We can see this working out in different ways from two examples. On the one hand the 'is' of a homophile orientation doesn't of itself say anything one way or another about the rightness of various homosexual acts or arrangements. On the other hand, the 'is' of feeling attraction to another person's spouse does not make an 'ought' to act on it. Or to take a different arena: it is the case that the strong exploit the weak, however this 'is' does not imply that they ought to do so: might does not make right of necessity. The 'is' of violent feelings does not make an 'ought' to murder.

So, does an evolutionary reason for monagamy translate into any kind of ethical steer?  Clearly not directly.However, the question remains in such a case of whether it is an 'is' we should go with, resist or think about carefully. I'm intrigued by the idea that such a thing might have evolved in order to protect babies and probably to support and protect their mothers. This opens the possibility that such behaviour generalised actually makes for a society in which grief and anxiety are minimised and so socially-cohesive behaviours fueled by healthful emotional states predominate. Basically a utilitarian perspective there.

If God is in some sense community where love, joy and shalom are characteristic then utilitarian perspectives deserve some consideration. If God desires the welfare of creation, a utilitarian approach is part of what should be considered. That being so, if the created order has, providentially, structures built in that tend towards the well-being and happiness of humans, we should take them seriously as clues to properly moral behaviour.

I would point up 'tend towards' in the last sentence: we need to note that this is 'aggregate ethics', that is something like Kant's (and Sartre's) universalisability argument. However, we should recognise that aggregates may not serve individuals in some cases and may even tyranically bear down and harm some if the 'norm' is made into a universal 'must'.

So does the evolutionarily-explicable tendency towards monogamy give any clues as to whether there are reasons to be wary of an aggregate-norm becoming universal-rules tyranny? Well, the putative reason of protection for child and mother would seem to offer the basis for a trump-card: if monogamy was bad for either or both, there may be reason to resist universal application and an insastance on faithfulness. This seems to be where we have got to in a lot of reasoning about such things: that protecting the welfare of vulnerable parties is reason to disolve a marriage.

I don't think that this is deriving an 'ought' from an 'is'. I think that it is treating the 'is' as having a providential dimension to it which is potentially a clue or a supporting reason for a general or aggregate ethic. Perhaps this is close to being a 'natural law' position but not entirely so. it doesn't absolutise the 'natural' state and in this case the providential approach (that is seeing a potentiall providentiality in the way some things have come to be) is not so much an argument as a way into a perspective to help uncover reasons for decisions or approaches. You'll note, of course, that I combined the evolutionary theory with a theological perspective. I think that this is probably the only way to try to ground a providential argument to be able to shift it from a simple 'is' into some kind of 'ought' in however weak or nuance-needing a way.

Perhaps I should freely confess that I've not made ethics a big part of my studies, so please forgive any naiveties in this. I'd be happy to have some gentle pointers to assessing the kind of approach I'm outlining -or even some cross referencing.