Nouslife: Dawkins' unrebuttable argument rebutted

04 November 2006

Dawkins' unrebuttable argument rebutted

I found this a handy synopsis and collecting of the reviews of Dawkins' God Delusion book. There's a good section on the anthropic principle as well as

Dawkins' argument appears to be that:

1. Once you posit one designer to explain organized complexity you have to posit an infinite regress of designers (because any designer capable of designing anything would necessarily demand the same kind of explanation in its own right, and so on),
2. but there cannot be an infinite regress of designers,
3. therefore one cannot rationally posit a designer in the first place.

Being consistent, one must of course make the same objection to the design inference in every case, including the cases that Dawkins himself admits are legitimate (such as the design inference from a sequence of prime numbers in a radio signal). The obvious legitimacy of design inferences in some cases constitutes an ad absurdum argument against the soundness of the above, logically valid argument. Dawkins rejects the plausibility of explanations framed in terms of an infinite regress, and objects to the design inference using a premise that implies the necessity of just such an infinite regress of explanations in all cases, despite the fact that he accepts the design inference in some cases. He can't have it both ways. Unless Dawkins is prepared to eliminate design inferences altogether, he must reject the 'who designed the designer' objection as unsound. Since the argument is logically valid, he can do this either by embracing explanations framed in terms of an infinite regress (an option frowned upon by most philosophers), or by rejecting the premise that once you posit one designer you have to posit an infinite regress of designers.

The reviewer has their own bit of fun too:

I recommend that believers and non-believers alike apply their 'native intelligence' to reading The God Delusion. However, I suggest doing so with help from a list of logical fallacies. Readers can then enjoy a stimulating game of 'I Spy'. In particular, look out for examples of: self-contradiction, begging the question, attacking a straw man, data picking, wishful thinking, appeal to ridicule and various ad hominim attacks from simple name-calling to 'poisoning the well.' Blowing away houses made from philosophical straw is a praiseworthy endeavour; but Dawkins' frequent substitution of straw houses for the real thing means that his critique of religion has more puff than bite.