Evil, context and responsibility

Clare Carlisle has produced a very helpful series of articles about Evil. I'm aware that work on corporisations involves considering the way that evil works in and through humans individually, aggregatedly and corporately. In this respect this article Evil, part 7: the trial of Adolf Eichmann (2) | Clare Carlisle | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk is important taking up Hannah Arendt's examination of Adolf Eichmann's role in the Shoah. Carlisle notes:

Eichmann's evasiveness seems to be characterised by what Kierkegaard called "a dialectical interplay between knowing and willing". Kierkegaard argued that, on the question of evil, the key difference between ancient Greek philosophy and Christianity was that the Greeks (Plato in particular) equated immorality with ignorance, whereas Christians insist that this is a matter of the will.

Certainly I recognise the decisive importance of willedness in defining what is truly evil and distinguishing such from what is merely 'unfortunate' or simply suffering unhappy eventualities. Suffering chance or unavoidable harms is different from suffering malicious or malevolent harms which are of a greater degree of evil than ignorant or  insouciant harms. They may all hurt 'as much' on the level of pain felt through the sensorium interacting with the brain -though I suspect that is a theoretical construct for the sake of argument rather than an actuality because (and this is the second point) pain is mitigated or exacerbated by the social dimensions of others' attitudes which affects how much we suffer the pain. By that I am drawing on an insight which I draw from what I understand of some Buddhist reflection that pain and suffering are not the same thing. The former is done to us, so to speak, the latter is centrally about our response to and internalisation /representation /construal of pain.

But I'm left at this point asking a question: what are the NT (indeed scriptural) understandings of evil in these more philosophical terms -rather would early Christians have recognised Augustine's thinking and indeed ours. Or would they have held a greater place for what Carlisle characterises as the Greek view. it seems to me that atonement theories indicate the latter, perhaps.

The other thing I'm considering in the light of these reflections is that even the 'willed-evil' truistic view has its ecology altered by  the idea that corporisations have a life and will of their own; that they could be responsible for evil in this voluntarist sense.